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Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult
Choice for Small Public Companies
Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley
Andrew Skouvakis*
I. Introduction: What is the problem?
The costs associated with implementing the requirements of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA)' are leading to a movement by small,
publicly traded companies2 to de-register from national exchanges and to
"go private."3 In the eighteen months after the SOA was passed, 146
firms filed the forms required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to go private, compared to just ninety-seven in the
nineteen months before the passing of the SOA.4
Congress did not necessarily foresee this problematic phenomenon
in its haste to pass the SOA.5 Moreover, despite an abundance of
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.A. The Pennsylvania State University, 1999.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2003).
2. For the purposes of this comment, the definition of small public companies is
generally equivalent to that of "small cap" companies. In defining "small cap"
companies:
"Cap" refers to the market capitalization or the value of a company's
outstanding equity. This is the most common measure of size used to
discriminate between companies that have issued stock, and is calculated by
multiplying the total number of shares outstanding by the share price. No
consensus exists as to what constitutes a small cap company. Generally the
term refers to companies whose size ranks at or below the levels of the smallest
20% of companies listed on exchanges such as the NYSE, the NASDAQ and
the AMEX.
Frank Hernandez, Going Private: Responding to the Small Cap Dilemma, IV SIA
RESEARCH REPS. 8, 3 (Aug. 21, 2003).
3. See definition of "going private" infra Part lI.D.
4. ELLEN ENGEL ET AL., THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND FIRMs' GOING-PRIVATE
DECISIONS 12 (Univ. of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, Working Paper Oct. 29,
2004), available at http://accounting.wharton.upenn.edu/seminar/ehw-gp04.pdf (last
visited Jan. 18, 2005) (on file with author).
5. See Alix Nyberg, Sticker Shock, CFO MAGAZINE (Sept. 01, 2003),
http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,10546,00.html?f-insidecfo (stating that many finance
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evidence about the strain the SOA is causing small companies,
lawmakers are not ready to acknowledge any problem with the law.6 The
SEC, the agency to which Congress delegated responsibility to
implement and carry out the SOA's requirements, along with Congress,
must soon recognize the special difficulties small companies are facing
and provide a remedy.
Going private is a legitimate business solution for certain public
companies. As revealed in Part II of this comment, however, the
problem associated with going private is that it should not be used by
most public companies simply to escape the current costs of being
public. 8 There is an impetus toward going private by small public
companies whose principal motivation to do so is the increased
regulation associated with the SOA. 9 This impetus is likely to diminish
once the SOA is fully understood, and those companies that go private
now risk losing all the advantages of being public that led them to the
public markets in the first place. Nevertheless, the SOA is overly
burdensome on small public companies because of the fixed costs
involved in implementing the law; the SEC or Congress should provide
some relief for these companies.
Part II analyzes the sections of the SOA that will affect the bottom
line of companies of all sizes and attempts to point out the flaws in the
SOA that lead to disproportionate compliance costs for small public
companies. Although the SOA is certainly not the only factor causing
companies to remove themselves from the public equity markets, it is a
primary factor. Additional factors, such as new more stringent rules
implemented by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the inter-
dealer quotation system, the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation (NASDAQ), are also discussed in Part II as
reasons motivating small companies to go private. Part II also addresses
the state of the economy and the evolution of popular perceptions about
what it means to be public, as factors influencing going private decisions.
Part II explains the problematic but popular solution of going private,
along with the reasons for the solution's popularity and its problems.
The primary contention of this comment, discussed in Part III, is
that going private as a result of the SOA is usually unnecessary, is
executives and attorneys such as Goodwin Procter LLP partner Steve Poss, believe that
"by rapidly legislating a whole set of processes, the law has become a windfall for
auditors and lawyers and a time drain on overburdened finance departments").
6. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 108TH CONG., REBUILDING
INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, PROTECTING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT,
THE FIRST YEAR (Comm. Print 2003).
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 7202.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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fraught with danger to minority shareholders, and can actually be
harmful to the long-term prospects of a small public company. Part III
also includes a proposed solution, which is based on differing levels of
regulatory and national exchange compliance for small companies, to the
problem of over-regulation of small public companies. Part IV
concludes by providing a brief summary of this comment and a
suggestion for an exercise of patience by small public companies
burdened by the SOA.
II. Background
A. The SOA and Other Factors Causing Companies to Go Private
The purpose of the SOA, as reported by Congress, is "to address the
systemic and structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets which
were revealed by repeated failures of audit effectiveness and corporate
financial and broker-dealer responsibility. . . ."'0 It is well documented
that the primary "failures" Congress was reacting to by passing the SOA
were the bankruptcies of Enron in December 2001 and Worldcom in July
2002.1 One influential think-tank pegged the first-year cost to the
United States economy of those two bankruptcies combined at $37 to
$42 billion. 12 In its haste to respond to these financial and political
catastrophes, 13 Congress passed the SOA and President George W. Bush
enacted the law in July 2002.14
The spectacular story of Enron's collapse is familiar to most.
Complex partnerships were set up to fraudulently hide losses and
overstate earnings in order to cause an increase in share price. 15 When
coupled with lax oversight by Enron's Board of Directors, these
10. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 4 (2002).
11. See REBUILDING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, PROTECTING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS,
supra note 6 (literally illustrating those two mega-bankruptcies, along with Global
Crossing); see also Scott Harshabarger, Corporate America's New Accountability,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 2003, at A19.
12. See CAROL GRAHAM ET AL., THE BIGGER THEY ARE, THE HARDER THEY FALL
(Brookings Inst. Working Paper, 2002) (measuring the impact of the Enron and
WorldCom bankruptcies as they have affected the Gross Domestic Product).
13. A Wall Street Journal editorial opined that the SOA "was adopted hastily, and
without adequate consideration by a Congress panicked about the possibility that the
Enron and WorldCom cases had seriously weakened investor confidence." Peter J.
Wallison, Editorial, Blame Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at A16.
14. See REBUILDING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, PROTECTING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS,
supra note 6.
15. See Joann S. Lublin, Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel Is Scrutinized: Links to
Company Of Certain Members Are Called Too Cozy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at Cl
(discussing Enron's collapse, its re-statement of $600 million, and the corporate
governance practices that led to the collapse).
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fraudulent accounting practices resulted in huge losses. 16 These losses
eventually led to the bankruptcy of the energy trading company, which
was once Wall Street's darling, and to the loss of millions of dollars by
investors.
The press has also told the story of Worldcom so many times that it
too is now familiar to most. Considered the biggest accounting fraud
ever, the events leading to Worldcom's bankruptcy are typical of the
kind of behavior the SOA is meant to curb. 17 Essentially, "[w]hen a
downturn in the broader market hurt WorldCom's stock.., the company
used accounting gimmicks to paper over losses and buoy its shares."'
' 8
B. The Requirements of the SOA and the Costs Associated with
Compliance
The requirements of the SOA include: the establishment of a Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board,' 9 auditor independence, 20 and
improved reporting of "financial results, commitments, transactions,
relationships with entities, and uncertainties[,] . . . as well as matters that
will have an impact on future operations. ,,21 For the purposes of this
comment, only the requirements most likely to have a significant impact
on small public companies will be discussed. These requirements
include increasing and accelerating public disclosure requirements,
hiring of new directors and financial experts,22 training of staff, and the
outsourcing of legal and accounting work.23
The requirements of the SOA that weigh most heavily on smaller
companies are numerous. An initial requirement calls for the filing of
statements reflecting transactions that involve management and principal
24stockholders. Prior to the SOA, these statements were to be reported
within ten days of the "close of the month in which the transaction
occurred., 25 Following the implementation of the SOA, "insiders," such
as management and principal stockholders, must file a statement within
16. See id.
17. See Ken Belson, Superlatives (and Contradictions) in a Fraud Trial, NY TIMES,
Jan. 16 2005, at B 1.
18. Id.
19. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C § 7211.
20. See id. §§ 201-209.
21. REBUILDING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, PROTECTING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS, supra
note 6.
22. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407.
23. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
24. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78p).
25. See 68 Fed. Reg. 25788, 25789 n.37 (May 13, 2003) (referring to Ownership
Reports And Trading By Officers, Directors And Principal Security Holders, Exchange
Act S.E.C. Docket 944, Aug. 27, 2002 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)).
1282 [Vol. 109:4
EXITING THE PUBLIC MARKETS
forty-eight hours of the close of the transaction.26 Another set of new
requirements accelerates the timeline for filing periodic disclosure
reports such as Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K.27  These accelerated
disclosure requirements produce increased costs in the form of increased
staff hours, the addition of software to streamline filing processes, and
expanded outside legal and auditor assistance.
In addition to accelerated and increased disclosure requirements, the
SOA mandates that companies modify the audit committee of the board
of directors to be comprised solely of independent members of the
board.2 8  This means that the independent members may not be
compensated for reasons other than being on the audit committee.29 The
SOA also implies that companies should install at least one "financial
expert" on the audit committee; if there is no expert on the committee,
reasons why must be given. a
The mandatory addition of directors and a financial expert has the
effect of increased overhead costs in the form of additional salaries;
however, the salary of these executives is not the primary problem with
the requirement mandating their participation in the administration of a
company. The real problem lies in finding competent people that are
willing to sit on the board and participate in the administration of public
companies now that the SOA introduces such uncertainty regarding
possible criminal and civil liability for officers and directors.31
The accelerated disclosure requirements of the SOA, the more
stringent criteria regarding certification of financial statements, and the
increased requirements on boards of directors have also impacted small
26. See id. The transactions referenced are purchases and sales by insiders and
"beneficial owner[s] of more than 10[%] of any class of any equity security" within the
meaning given to such transactions by section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
15 U.S.C.S. § 7 8p (2003).
27. See generally SEC Final Rule: Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and
Disclosure Concerning Website Access to Reports, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8128.htm#P80-6485 (last modified Sept. 26, 2003)
(summarizing timing of new reporting requirements); see also Carter Ledyard & Milburn
LLP, Corporate Department Publication, "Going Private " After The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002," available at http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub-1144369-1.html [hereinafter,
"CLM web"].
28. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f); see also CLM
web, supra note 27.
29. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f).
30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407; see also CLM web, supra note 27.
31. In addition: "Members of audit committees face new burdens. [The SOA] and
corporate governance initiatives by the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
generally require audit committees to more actively oversee companies' independent
accountants and internal controls." Michael J. Levitin & Steven S. Snider, Going Public:
Been There, Done That, "Going Private" Now, WASH. Bus. J. (Oct. 21, 2002), at
http://washington.bizjournals.com/ washington/stories/2002/10/21 /focus4.html.
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public companies' balance sheets by forcing them to hire outside law and
accounting firms. 32  These outside firms, in addition to the in-house
training needed to bring employees up to speed with what new practices
must be instituted to comply with the SOA, are adding up to unbearable
costs for small companies.
For example, section 404 of the SOA provides that companies must
retain outside accounting firms to report on management's assessment of
the effectiveness of "internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting., 33  Apparently, the SEC previously considered
establishing such a requirement, but never instituted one because of its
expense.34
Many companies cite section 404 as the primary cost inflator of the
SOA. "[The provision is] forcing companies to review, and in many
cases change, a multitude of their basic, daily procedures-including
how they maintain records, secure computerized data and handle
inventory. Companies are paying hundreds of thousands and even
millions of dollars to auditors as they scramble to comply. '35  For
example: "Scientific Technologies Inc., which manufactures safety
products in California, Utah and in a joint venture in Singapore, projects
the cost of its compliance at $500,000 to $750,000. With about $60
million in annual sales, that's not insignificant.,
36
One of the indirect costs of complying with the SOA is the increase
in insurance premiums that companies must pay to offset the personal
liability of directors and officers.37 Directors and officers insurance, has
increased by approximately 30% to 40%.38 The reason for the increase is
that the SOA "spells out requirements for director actions in areas where
boards previously had considerable discretion or wiggle room and thus
heightens the probability of shareholder lawsuits for any fumbles that
32. See Tamara Loomis, Sarbanes-Oxley Burdens Small Companies, 228 N.Y. L.J. 1
(2002).
33. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
34. See Fulcrum Financial Inquiry Report, Going Private Becomes More Attractive,
at http://www.fulcruminquiry. com/article28.htm (last modified Nov. 2003).
35. Jonathan Peterson, Corporate Reforms Irk Small Business, LA TIMES, Jan. 16,
2005, at Cl. At least the SEC has taken the complaints about section 404's onerous
requirements seriously. "[SEC] officials announced the creation of an advisory panel of
outside experts to consider the effect of Section 404 on smaller businesses." Id.
36. Id.
37. Tamara Loomis, Socked by Sox, Corporate Counsel (Jul. 1, 2003),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC .jsp?id= 1055463668799.
38. See Murray Coleman, More Companies Exit Public Markets, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Aug. 26, 2003, at A-1 (quoting investment banker, Christopher Baclawski at CB
Capital Partners); see also Levitin, supra note 31 (citing a report by Willis Group
Holdings stating that "weaker companies can expect increases of as much as 400
percent.").
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appear to violate the statute. 39
Congress does not have a formal process for prospectively
determining how much it will cost companies to comply with legislation
like the SOA. 40  The only costs requiring estimates by the SEC in
connection with implementing the SOA are those directly attributed to
filing paperwork, namely the disclosure requirements. 41 Thus, the haste
with which Congress passed the SOA caused a drastic increase in SEC
compliance costs for public companies--costs that were never
contemplated by legislators.
Adding to small companies' frustrations is the Congressional refusal
to acknowledge any going private trend among small public companies.
In fact, the House Committee on Financial Services published a report in
2003 that concluded that there is "no trend toward going private. 42 That
House report, however, does not include any reference to what
percentage of the companies cited are small versus what percentage are
large.43  The Securities Industry Association, on the other hand,
researched how many of these companies going private were small, and
concluded that the vast majority were indeed small companies.
44
There are many specific examples across the country of the
magnitude of costs small companies are incurring as a result of the
SOA's requirements. One company in Port Washington, New York,
with a net income of $300,000 and sales of $151 million in 2002, has to
spend $250,000 a year to comply with the SOA. a s Another company,
39. D&O Liability Insurance Rates Rise Amid Corporate Scandals, 38 Mergers &
Acquisitions: The Dealmaker's Journal 3, at 10 (Mar. 2003), available at
http://majoumal.nvst.com/sample/samplemaj.pdf.
40. According to Thomas McCool, head of financial markets and community
investment at the General Accounting Office. See Nyberg, supra note 5.
41. Even though the SEC attempted to estimate those costs, the figures it reported
were drastically low, according to senior management of many companies. See id.
42. The committee report states:
Anecdotally, a handful of companies have reported that the costs associated
with Sarbanes-Oxley's requirements of certification of financial statements,
implementation of independent boards and audit committees, and accelerated
company disclosures have forced them to go private. However, based on the
number of pertinent SEC filings, there is little firm evidence that Sarbanes-
Oxley is actually creating such a trend.
See REBUILDING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, PROTECTING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note
5. But see source cited infra note 44.
43. Id.
44. The Securities Industry Association's director of research was cited as saying
that more than 75% of going private transactions in the eighteen months preceding
September, 2003 involved small companies. See Ari Weinberg, Small Companies Driven
Out Of National Exchanges, http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/09/cx-aw-0909private.html
(Sept. 9, 2003).
45. See Del Jones, Sarbanes Oxley, Dragon or white knight?, USA TODAY, Oct. 20,
2003, at 01B, (showing the compliance costs of hardware wholesaler Moore-Handley).
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based in Fort Worth, Texas, with a market cap between $3 million and
$4 million, projected paying outside auditing and consulting firms
$500,000 per year.46  These SOA compliance costs are immensely
disproportionate to costs of large companies like Wal-Mart, who had a
$6.7 billion net income in 2002. 4' Billion dollar companies like Wal-
Mart can afford to pay millions to comply because a few million dollars
is only a small percentage of the company's gross income. 48  If
compliance costs represent 83% of a company's income, however, as
they do for the New York company mentioned above, that company will
certainly seek to escape those inequitable costs by any method
available.49
C. The New NYSE and NASDAQ Rules, the Economy and Public
Perception
SEC rule 1 OA-3, promulgated under the SOA, directs the NYSE and
the NASDAQ "to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is
not in compliance with the audit committee requirements specified in
Rule 10A-3.,, 50 As a result, the NYSE revised its manual to require all
companies listed on the exchange to assemble their boards of directors
with a majority of members being independent. 5' The NYSE manual
also includes more stringent requirements for director audit and
compensation committees, which supplement the requirements imposed
by the SOA.52  The NASDAQ has also imposed similar new
46. Maria Halkias, Fort Worth, Texas-Based Garden Retailer Decides to Go Private
to Cut Expenses, DALLAS MORN'G NEWS, (No page), Sept. 19, 2003.
47. See Jones, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. There is also evidence that the costs discussed above are not the only ones on the
horizon for public companies. At least one journalist reports that:
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently said it would be examining
the entire proxy process, which is likely to result in making it easier for
shareholder activists to avail themselves of the process at the expense of the
company and weaken management's control of the process. Additionally, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board has made it clear that it is all but certain
to adopt a standard requiring the expensing of options. Also, measures are
being considered that could require the mandatory splitting of the positions of
chairman and chief executive officer between two individuals.
Bruce D. Knapp, Public No More With Regulations Looming, Small And Midcap
Companies Would Do Well To Go Or Stay Private, Prr. POST GAZETrE, Aug. 26, 2003,
at C9.
50. Notices, Self-Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64154, (Nov. 4, 2003) at 14-15. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Oa-3 (2003).
51. Notices, Self-Regulatory Orgs., Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64154, (Nov. 4, 2003) at 16-17.
52. Id. at 27-28.
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requirements, including director independence. 3  These obligatory
requirements by the NYSE and the NASDAQ only add to the burden
small companies are facing as a result of the SOA.
The current state of the U.S. economy, including the state of capital
markets, coupled with the public perception of public companies, are
additional and substantial factors driving companies to go private. The
effect of U.S. public companies losing a combined $7.7 trillion in market
capitalization 54 has caused many of those companies to lose the ability to
attract investors, use public stock to acquire other companies, and
provide liquidity for employees wishing to exercise options.55
Furthermore, the lack of financial industry analyst coverage5 6 for
small companies "often negates the liquidity that is typically associated
with publicly owned shares.,, 57 The prestige and good-will propelled
upon public companies during the stock market boom of the 1990s has
evolved into skepticism and outright contempt for public companies and
their executives.5 8 This loss of prestige and increase in ill-will is partly
attributable to the relentless media coverage of federal prosecutions of
corporate executives. 59  The equally relentless prosecution of these
executives and of the financial analysts associated with them by zealous
officials like New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has only
added to negative public perception.6 °
Although the economy, stock market, and popular perception have
all contributed to companies' wishes to exit the public markets, the
ultimate factor has been the enactment of the SOA.6 1 Without the SOA,
53. Id. at 46-70.
54. See Hernandez, supra note 2 (defining "market capitalization").
55. Levitin, supra note 31; see also Bruce D. Knapp, Public No More With
Regulations Looming, Small And Midcap Companies Would Do Well To Go Or Stay
Private, PIr. POST GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 2003, at C9.
56. Analyst coverage is necessary in order to create interest by potential investors in
a company, driving up demand for the stock, and resulting in a higher valuation for the
company.
57. See Knapp, supra note 49.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Bush seeks new business ethic: In speech on Wall
Street, president wants longer jail terms, tougher laws to curb corporate abuses, CNN
MONEY, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/09/news/bush/ index.htm (July 9, 2002); see
also Max Baucus, Charles E. Grassley and John McCain, Editorial, A Second Betrayal,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at A12 (discussing the need for stricter punishment for
corporate wrongdoers).
60. See Deborah Solomon, Zealous States Shake Up Legal Status Quo, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 28, 2003, at A4 (discussing Spitzer's wish "to extend new accounting checks
beyond publicly traded corporations ... ").
61. In a PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey of Chief Executives around the Globe
taken at the Davos, Switzerland World Economic Forum, CEOs cited "over-regulation"
as "one of the biggest threats to their growth prospects." The survey also revealed that
"[g]overnment is also seen as a threat to growth. In fact, almost half of the CEOs
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the new NYSE and NASDAQ rules may have never been imposed or
could have been more gradually phased in over a longer period of time.
In addition, the prosecution of corporate criminals would arguably be
more difficult without the SOA.62
D. Going Private
1. Definitions and Procedure
Many small public companies that are suddenly faced with the
onerous costs of complying with the SOA have decided that the only way
to avoid these costs is to "go private." The SEC defines "going private"
as reducing the number of shareholders in a company to less than 300,
thereby escaping the SEC's reporting requirements.63 Although this
comment focuses on the definition provided by the SEC, there is more
64than one way to go private. The scope of this comment is limited to a
general analysis of federal securities law issues involved in going
private.65
surveyed feel that government is out of touch with business needs." See
PricewaterhouseCoopers' Global CEO Survey Reveals Overwhelming Confidence in
Business Outlook for 2003, at http://www.pwcglobal.com/Extweb/ncsurvres.nsf/
docid/3E209C17DCA1262C85256CBD0044B1OF (Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
62. Although the SOA makes it easier for the Department of Justice to prosecute
corporate executives, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer relies on New York's
securities fraud statute, the Martin Act. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c (2003).
63. See SEC Fast Answers, "Going Private," at http://www.sec.gov/answers/
gopriv.htm (last modified Aug. 9, 2004).
64. Multiple definitions of going private transactions can be found. E.g., a treatise
titled "Going Private" states: "A 'true' going private transaction ... is one by which an
individual or a group of individuals controlling a public corporation by virtue of an
impregnable stock position .... undertakes a corporate transaction in order to acquire,
either immediately or on a deferred basis, the entire equity interest in the corporation."
BORDEN ARTHUR M. & YUNIS JOEL A., GOING PRIVATE, § 1.02, at § 1.02 (15th ed. 1997);
see also MARC MORGENSTERN & PETER NEALIS, GOING PRIVATE: A REASONED RESPONSE
TO SARBANES OXLEY?, (SEC 23rd Annual Government-Business Forum on Small
Business Capital Formation Sept. 20, 2004) (stating:
The broad vernacular of "going private," encompasses two events so
dramatically different that they should never be referred to under a common
rubric. The conventional reference to a company "going private" is in regard to
a major organic corporate transaction. Common structures are leveraged buy-
outs ("LBOs") or management buy-outs ("MBOs"). A "going private" deal
typically dramatically alters the control, capitalization, and ownership
composition of a public company. The second reference is to a "delisting" or
"deregistration" process pursuant to which a public company makes a transition
to being a non-reporting company.).
65. Delaware law is the only state law discussed. A brief state law analysis is limited
to Delaware because of that state's leadership position in corporate law matters and
recent decisions involving risks to minority shareholders in going private transactions.
1288 [Vol. 109:4
EXITING THE PUBLIC MARKETS
Thanks to the internet boom of the 1990s and the high stock market
participation rate of Americans,66 the vast majority of Americans know
what a public company is. 67 When a company's shares are publicly
traded, vast amounts of capital are available for use at the company's
68discretion. However, the recent depressed state of the equity markets in
several industry sectors has led to a dwindling of many public
companies' market capitalizations.
69
Small public companies, the ones with the lowest market
capitalizations, are still forced to partake in what are viewed as
"cornerstones of US capital markets," that is, "disclosure regulation and
associated enforcement., 70 These obligations, augmented by the SOA,
are necessary for transparent company operations and investor
confidence. These obligations, however, are also a major component of
what is prompting small public companies to exit the public markets and
go private.
On its website, the SEC uses three types of transactions as examples
of how a public company goes private. 71 The three transactions occur
when: (1) "Another company or individual makes a tender offer to buy
all or most of the company's publicly held shares;, 7 2 (2) "The company
merges with or sells the company's assets to another company; or"
73
(3) "The company... declare[s] a reverse stock split that not only
reduces the number of shares but also reduces the number of
shareholders."74
66. See Daniela Deane, Property Owners Build Wealth Slowly but Surely, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2003, at HI (citing the Federal Reserve for stating that 52% of Americans
own stock).
67. Advantages to being a public company include unlimited access to capital (at
least theoretically), shareholder liquidity and the ability to attract qualified personnel with
stock options. See Stephen J. Redner, Thinking Of Going Public? Think Twice, Then
Read The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 521, 522 (2002).
But see Knapp, supra note 49.
68. See id.
69. See David A. Stockton et al., Going private: The Best Option?, NAT'L LAW J.,
June 23, 2003, at 19.
70. See Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC
Disclosure Regulation (Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper No. 02-24-
B, 2003).
71. See "Going Private," supra note 63. These three transactions are sufficient for
the purposes of this comment.
72. A "tender offer" has been defined as a-"general, publicized bid by an individual
or group to buy shares of a publicly-owned company, the shares of which were traded on
a national securities exchange, at a price substantially above the current market price."
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54-55 (2nd Cir. 1985).
73. See "Going Private," supra note 63.
74. Id. A reverse stock split is defined by Black's as "[a] reduction in the number of
a corporation's shares by calling in all outstanding shares and reissuing fewer shares
having greater value." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (7th ed. 1999).
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For the purposes of this comment, the public markets referred to
above are necessarily limited to the two previously mentioned dominant
national exchanges: the NYSE and the NASDAQ.75  Companies
registered on these two exchanges initially had to meet the registration
requirements of Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
order to achieve registration.7 6
To de-register and go private, companies registered under Section
12 must file a form certifying to the SEC that they meet the requirements
for de-registration.77 Preceding the successful filing of this form, a
company has to remove itself from the exchange or quotation system to
which it belongs. In this manner, the company no longer has to meet the
disclosure requirements of the SEC.
Rule 13-e3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires
companies effecting any of the three types of going-private transactions
described above to disclose certain information to security holders.78
This disclosure is in addition to the requirements of Section 12 for de-
registration from an exchange or quotation system.
79
2. Reasons for the Popularity of Going Private
The SOA has been cited as the principal motive for many recent or
pending going private transactions.80 However, the additional reasons
that proponents of going private give to bolster their argument are also
compelling if looked at with an uncritical eye. Reasons include
decreased liquidity and less access to capital markets for many small
public companies that have lost much of their value in the recent
downward trend of the stock market .8  The ability of private companies
to focus on long-term goals and strategy, as opposed to always
"operating the company to simply satisfy the forecast for next quarter's
earnings," has also been cited as a benefit of going private.82
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e)(a)(ii)(B) (2003).
76. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 781 (2003) (codifying the Securities Exchange Act section
12(b) under which NYSE companies are registered and section 12(g) under which
NASDAQ companies are registered).
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2003).
78. See id. § 240.13e-3(e).
79. See id. § 240.13e-3(e)(1).
80. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
81. See Lawrence H. Gennari, Guest Commentary: Let's take this offline: Sarbanes-
Oxley and 'going private' (Gadsby Hannah LLP, Boston, Mass.), at
http://www.ghlaw.com/html/05publications/1 articles/GuestCommentary-
Gennari2003.htm (last visited Jan 24, 2005).
82. Cristy Lomenzo Parker, "Going Private ": Business and Procedural
Considerations in Seeking Relief from Reporting and Corporate Governance
Requirements (Rutan & Tucker LLP, Costa Mesa, Cal.), at http://www.rutan.com/
pdf/GoingPrivate.pdf (Mar., 2003).
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Another cited benefit is informality of corporate governance in
private, closely held companies.83 Informality is said to allow business
flexibility as well as decreased exposure to class action securities
litigation arising from non-timely or incomplete SEC disclosure.84 Some
commentators say that going private now may lead to a profitable future
sale or may allow companies to revert to being public in the future, at
which time they can "reap the attendant benefits. 85 However, as shown
in Part III of this comment, all the above reasons are eclipsed by the
costs, possible liability, and long-term detriment associated with going
private.
I1. Analysis
A. Reasons to Avoid Going Private
Going private is generally not the proper response to the increased
costs associated with being a public company. Although many law firms
nationwide promote the use of going private and de-registering as a
useful way to avoid compliance costs in the short term, this is usually not
the best long-term strategy for companies seeking continuing growth. In
addition, the costs of going private are not insignificant, and the possible
liability to shareholders is considerable.
As an initial matter, most large companies' senior executives expect
that the costs of compliance with the SOA will remain constant or
decline over time.86 Costs for small companies should also remain the
same or decline because once the systems required for compliance are in
place, the initial implementation costs will disappear.
Being a public company necessitates a higher level of responsibility
to shareholders than being a private company. Along with this
responsibility comes regulation, in the form of the SEC regulations
discussed in this comment, that are augmented by the SOA. Those
regulations mandate transparency of corporate operations, executive
accountability for the truth of financial statements, and fairness in
dealings with shareholders.87 Companies should not seek to go private
simply to escape these responsibilities because these responsibilities
represent the manifestation of an American system of business values.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See CLM web, supra note 27.
86. See Senior Executives At Large Multinational Companies Divided on Cost of
Complying with Sarbanes-Oxley Act, at http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/
ncpressrelease.nsf/DocID/BF54349CBB406BB585256D5600687C63 (July 1, 2003).
87. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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However hastily the SOA was passed, the purpose of it is to ensure
behavior that was already required before its passage. 8  Even private
companies will now seek to comply with the SOA because the practices
it mandates will become a standard that all companies must live up to.
The price tag of a going private transaction is not a factor that
should be overlooked by those willing to take their companies private.
Investment banking firms, law firms, and accounting firms are all
necessary advisors to a going private transaction. 90 In addition to the
direct advisors to the company, there is also a group of advisors to any
independent board of directors "appointed to evaluate the fairness of the
offer on behalf of the public shareholders." 91 The whole process can take
months.9 2
Also to be considered is the expense of the proxy solicitation
process. In order for any company to effect a going private transaction,
depending on state law and the articles of incorporation, the majority of
shareholders of the company must vote affirmatively. 93 Depending on
the number of shareholders, the cost of mailing all the required
information 94 can be significant.
The long term strategy for many small private companies is often to
go public in order to grow or to be bought by a larger, public company.95
Companies that are now public are choosing to go private to avoid costs
associated with the SOA. Many companies, however, will want to go
88. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
89. Companies wishing to go private often do so by a buyout by management
(MBO), which can put such a strain on a company because of the debt acquired to effect
the buyout that the company may be forced to pursue bankruptcy. For example, a
company named Maxxim Medical went bankrupt because of the debt it acquired in order
to go private. See Nevin Sanli & Tom Pastore, Remaining Public-The Best Option in
Troubled Markets? (SP&H, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal.), at http://www.businessnation.com/
library/articles/pages/Articles/372-RemainingPublicArticle.pdf (July 17, 2003).
90. See Grant Thornton LLP, Public companies explore "going private" in today's
uncertain economic climate, at http://www.grantthornton.com/content/84763.asp (on file
with author).
91. See id. (stating that "this is on top of coming up with the capital to buy out the
public shareholders. In most cases, this capital may be more expensive than the cost of
the capital as a public company, thereby putting a financial burden on the company and
restraining investment for growth."). Id.
92. Public companies weigh benefits of going private, ST. Louis Bus. J., at
http://www.bizjournals.com/ stlouis/stories/2003/06/23/focus2.html?t--printable (on file
with author).
93. See BORDEN & YUNIS, supra note 64 § 13A. 11.
94. Id. ("The proxy statement will notify the public stockholders of the date, time
and place of the meeting of the stockholders to adopt and approve the [transaction].").
95. For example, venture capitalists, which fund many start-ups generally have two
goals in mind when funding a private company. One goal is for the company to be
bought at a favorable price and another is for the company to go public. See Loomis,
infra note 99.
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public again or be acquired if they wish to maximize growth or maximize
profits. To do this they will re-incur the cost of going public, which is
very expensive.96  This is terribly inefficient because they have
previously gone public.
Additionally, large public companies interested in acquiring smaller
companies are increasing their scrutiny of the corporate governance
practices of their targets.97 This means that private companies with an
exit strategy tied to acquisition must follow the general practices outlined
by the SOA regardless of whether the company is subject to SEC
reporting.
Another reason why going private can cause great detriment to a
company and its shareholders is the almost certain shareholder actions
98
that would be filed as a result.99  Section 13(e) of the Securities
96. One business valuation firm in Los Angeles that advocates remaining private
does a nice job of generally outlining the costs, writing that:
The most significant cost is the underwriter commission, which generally costs
about 7% of the offering size but can cost significantly more, on a percentage
basis, depending on the size of the offering. Then, of course, there are legal
fees, accounting and auditing fees, printing fees, SEC and state registration
fees, listing fees or quotation fees, and company expenses for travel and road
show requirements. Total fees may reach 9% - 20% of the offering. Thus, the
total cost of capital to round-trip back to the public markets may be much more
expensive than just remaining a public company.
See Remaining Public-The Best Option in Troubled Markets? (Sanli Pastore & Hill,
Inc., Los Angeles, CA), at www.sphvalue.com/pdf/remaining-public.pdf (Jul. 17, 2003).
97. "Lenders and public companies seeking to acquire private companies are
stepping up their levels of scrutiny and due diligence, says Trent Gazzaway, national
director of corporate governance advisory services for Grant Thornton in Charlotte, N.C."
Robert J. Derocher, Circles of Influence: The long arm of Sarbanes-Oxley touches the
private as well as the public sector-and that might not be so bad, at http://www.insight-
mag.com, (on file with author). In addition "[p]rivate companies better have their
corporate governance environment in control.., because it's going to be looked at by the
acquiring company and it may affect the value of what's being sold." Id.
98. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (stating
that a shareholder in a derivative action "step[s] into the corporation's shoes and...
seek[s] in its right the restitution he could not demand in his own")); see also Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (holding that "[t]he nature of the action is two-
fold. First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to
sue. Second, it is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf,
against those liable to it."); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (stating that
"[T]he rule is so well settled as to require no citation of authorities" that when officers
commit fraud, proper action is derivative).
99. Going private attracts intense scrutiny from shareholders seeking to maximize
their stock price. According to one corporate securities lawyer, going private transactions
are "almost always subject to litigation." Paula Moore, 'Going Private' Not as Simple as
It Sounds, DENVER Bus. J., http://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2003/
04/21/smallbl.html?t=printable (Apr. 21, 2003); see also Tamara Loomis, Costs of
Compliance Soar After Sarbanes-Oxley, May 2, 2003, 228 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
(Philadelphia) 85 (stating that shareholder suits are "almost inevitable" in going private
transactions).
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Exchange Act of 1934 requires certain disclosures by companies seeking
to go private.'0°  If the required disclosures are not made or are
inadequate in a material way, SEC Rule 13-e3,10 1 promulgated under the
1934 Act, allows for a private right of action. 
02
The reason rules like 13-e3 exist is that investors must be protected
from possible abuses of insiders initiating certain types of going private
transactions. For example, in a purchase and sale of assets, where the
acquiring company includes a controlling shareholder, the opportunity
for abuse of minority shareholders is always present. This opportunity
arises as a result of the "inherently coercive nature"' 03 of going private
transactions, including the power of majority shareholders to force
minority shareholders to tender their shares at a price set by the
majority.
10 4
As with any fundamental corporate change, going private is subject
to state law standards governing the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors.105 At least one commentator, however, has noted that the SOA
"represents another instance of federal intrusion seeking to compensate
for lax standards at the state level."'10 6 According to this commentator,
the SOA amplifies directors' duties, "largely supplanting Delaware law
concerning the duty to monitor" officers, employees, and the whole
corporate governance process. 0 7  Nevertheless, Delaware law is still
relevant in the context of fiduciary duties of directors effecting
transactions such as going private.
Delaware courts apply the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,
including fair dealing and fair price, when a going private transaction
occurs in the form of a merger.'0 8 If the minority shareholders believe
100. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2003).
102. This right is implied. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp. 826 F.2d 1470, 1474
(6th Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 1476 (stating that "minority shareholders are forced to exchange their
shares for cash or other consideration. The coercive effect of these transactions is
reinforced by the fact that the majority shareholders control the timing and terms of the
transaction.").
104. See id.
105. See Cristy Lomenzo Parker, "Going Private ": Business and Procedural
Considerations in Seeking Relief from Reporting and Corporate Governance
Requirements (Rutan & Tucker LLP, Costa Mesa, Cal.),
http://www.rutan.com/pdf/GoingPrivate.pdf (Mar. 2003).
106. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance Of State Corporate Law In The
Governance Of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 317, 374-375 (Jan. 2004).
107. Id. at 375.
108. See Gregory J. Schwartz, Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public
Shareholder and Enhance the Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 489, 496-515
(1986) (discussing "Delaware's fiduciary duty of fair dealing and fair Price in the going
private merger context" using the following four cases: Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
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they have not been treated fairly, as they often believe, they can bring a
derivative action against the corporation, resulting in great detriment to
the corporation. 10 9  The expense and possible liability involved in
defending these kinds of suits is not insignificant and should be
considered carefully by any company wishing to go private in order to
avoid expenses.
110
B. Escaping the Perceived Necessity to Go Private
Under the authority given to the SEC in the SOA, that agency
should promulgate rules that exempt small public companies from
certain requirements.'11  The SOA states that the SEC may, at its
discretion, provide exemptions from some rules required to be made
under the statute."
12
Alternatively, or in conjunction with exempting small companies
from certain requirements, Congress and the SEC should establish
several levels of compliance to correspond with the companies' abilities
to comply and maintain a healthy bottom line." 3  After all, one of the
primary missions of the SEC' 14 is to level the playing field and make the
capital markets accessible to all, including small companies."'
A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977), Tanzer v. International General Industries, 379 A.2d 1121
(Del. 1977), Roland Int'l. Corp. v. Najjar, 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978), Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983)).
109. Another expense to consider is the premium that one must pay above the share
price at the time of the going private transaction if one is buying shares. See BORDEN &
YUNiS, supra note 64 (citing Houlihan, Lokey, Howard and Zukin, Mergerstat Review
1997 (1997) as saying that "annual comparisons of the average premiums offered over
the then prevailing trading price in merger transactions, Mergerstat found that the median
premium to market price for going private transactions from 1987 through 1996 varied
from 8% to 35%").
110. Even though being public may subject directors to shareholder lawsuits arising
from violations of the SOA, these suits were already a possibility under earlier securities
law such as Rule 10-b5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). The only new express
private right of action provided for in the SOA is for employees who are discharged or
suffer other discrimination due to "whistleblowing" on securities law violations. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1514).
111. See Knowledge@Wharton, Do High Regulatory Costs Force Public Firms to Go
Private?, at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/index.cftn?fa=viewArticle&ID=847
(Sept. 10, 2003) (quoting Wharton Business School Professor Christial Leuz, as saying
that "regulators may wish to consider establishing multi-tiered equity markets featuring a
variety of standards").
112. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(3)(C) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78)
(authorizing the SEC to exempt companies' audit committee members from
independence requirements).
113. See id.
114. See generally Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1969) (discussing purposes of Securities Exchange Act, the
legislation that created the SEC).
115. Another policy consideration for Congress is that "[c]hasing away small
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The NYSE and NASDAQ should also consider relaxing their rules
in conjunction with more lenient SEC mandated levels of mandatory
SOA compliance for small public companies. Without a more relaxed
regulatory environment for small public companies, the trend towards
going private is likely to continue and may burgeon.
IV. Conclusion
While the SOA has imposed a heavier burden on small companies
that are a part of the public markets, these burdens come with
advantages" 16 that outweigh the possible short term benefits of reverting
to private status. Along with being a public company comes greater
fiduciary responsibility. That accountability is now greater than ever
because of the recent abuses of the trust placed in the fiduciaries that
managed companies like Enron and WorldCom. 1
7
Specific examples of companies like the ones in New York and
Texas discussed in Part II.B which chose to go private because of the
SOA are plentiful. These companies' experiences should be the
exception and not the norm. Going private is the right solution for some
companies but should not be used as a universal remedy for avoiding
regulatory compliance costs because being a public company is so
advantageous and the economic climate and public perception are
already starting to improve.
Most companies should not attempt to avoid the new responsibility
cast on them by the SOA because in the long term, the legislation should
be amended and interpreted to further the American economic policies
favoring small businesses. Until then, small public companies should
weather the current upsurge in regulatory costs and adopt a wait-and-see
attitude.
companies-the lifeblood of the economy-from new funding could become a
significant economic detriment." See Ari Weinberg, Small Companies Driven Out Of
National Exchanges, http://www.forbes.com/ 2003/09/09/cx aw 0909private.html (Sept.
9, 2003) (quoting the Securities Industry Association Director of Research, as saying
"[a]s a whole, [small companies] hire more, are more productive and bring about more
innovations.., large firms prompted [the enactment of the SOA], but the ones penalized
as a result are the small businesses.").
116. See Redner, supra note 67.
117. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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